Selección adversa y seguros privados de salud en el Perú
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57063/ricay.v3i1.80Keywords:
Adverse selection, asymmetric information, health insuranceAbstract
Using the methodology of binary probit models and information from the National Household Survey (ENAHO), the probability of accessing private health insurance in Peru was analyzed. The results show that sick people have a greater probability of accessing private health insurance, evidencing the hypothesis of adverse selection. In contrast, the age of the individual shows a lower probability of accessing this insurance. For their part, educational level, sex, geographic stratum and average income increase the probability of accessing private health insurance.
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